This paper proposes semantic definitions of the twin concepts of'given' and 'new' information, and shows how these definitions can be used to fill a gap in current theories of sentence accent. The semantic definitions proposed are based on a variant of Discourse Representation Theory in which the notion of an anaphoric relation is generalized beyond the case in which the denotation of the anaphor equals that of its antecedent. The resulting theory of sentence accent explains aspects of human speech production as well as understanding, and could be applied in automatic speech synthesis as well as, in principle, in automatic speech understanding.
The present paper deals with one way in which accent can have semantic impact, namely by marking which part of an utterance conveys 'new' information, and which part conveys information that is already 'given'. This particular function of accent, in which it marks 'informational status', was already noted by Halliday (Halliday 1967) and others, and has been studied extensively by psycholinguists. It has been established that high pitch accents mark new information, while opinions differ somewhat on the impact of low pitch accents.
3 I will follow 'tHart et al. (1991) in assuming that accent is basically one linguistic phenomenon that has different phonetic realizations, all of which can be used to mark 'new' information. Researchers in this tradition have found, for example, that, for a hearer, accent does more to distinguish between given and new Noun Phrases than syntactic cues such as the distinction between active and passive mood (Most & Saltz 1979) , or even fronting (Nooteboom et al. 1981; Nooteboom & Kruyt 1987) .
Although it has not even been noted, differences in the informational status of a Noun Phrase can even correspond with differences in truth conditions. For instance, in the discourse ( 
1) My neighbour is a funny character. John is really nice though,
John can either be my neighbour or an entirely different person. This leads to a clear-cut, truth-conditional difference in the meaning of the sentence. Note that the two readings may be disambiguated by prosodic means. For example, if John is accented-in which case I will often write + John, while writing ~John to indicate that John is not accented-he will tend to be interpreted as distinct from my neighbour.
Knowledge about the relation between informational status and accent can explain aspects of human speech production as well as understanding, and is potentially useful in various areas of natural language processing. In principlethat is, if and when sentence accent can be recognized automaticallyautomatic natural language understanding could make use of accenting to disambiguate spoken messages. Conversely, speech synthesis programs already do make use of the correspondence between accent and newness to improve accent assignment algorithms. Yet improvements over less enlightened predecessors are not as dramatic as one might expect. Why is that?
One reason why 'informational status ' has not yet led to much improvement in natural language processing systems is that few theoretical proposals so far have offered precise definitions of the relevant notions. This is clearly true for the older proposals, such as those of the Prague school, and those in Halliday (1967) , Chafe (1976) , and Clark & Haviland (1977) , which were not based on a detailed theory of discourse and did not aim for formal precision, but it is true for later proposals as well. 4 In addition, natural language processing systems have often interpreted givenness and newness at the wrong 'level' of linguistic information. In Bell Labs' Newspeak, for example, a content word is marked as 'given' provided it has the same root as one of its accessible predecessors. I will argue that the required notion of givenness is a semantic one of the sort that can be based on a version of Discourse Representation Theory. The idea of bringing a theory of discourse to bear on accenting algorithms is not completely new. For example, there are hints in Hirschberg (1990) of how Grosz & Sidner's work on focus spaces may be used to arrive at an appropriate definition of newness, and van Kuppevelt (1991) has worked out another proposal. However, to my knowledge, Grosz & Sidner's ideas have not yet been worked out in sufficient detail actually to predict accents in context, and the same holds for van Kuppevelt's proposal, which relies on complex inferences about the hidden structure of a discourse into a sequence of question-answer pairs, where the question may be explicit, but more often only implicit. In addition, these theories have little to say about a class of cases that we will discuss at some length-cases in which the expression relies for its interpretation on some other expression, without having the same denotation as this expression. 5 The present proposal seeks to eliminate these limitations.
Accenting is a complex issue. Even if all accents are used to highlight parts of an utterance, an expression may be highlighted for various reasons, such as: contrast with some other expression, an unusual or otherwise remarkable interpretation, strong emotion, or the mere desire to liven up the intonation of public speech. It would be extremely difficult to deal with all these factors in one paper. The present paper deals only with accents that highlight new information-in a pretty strict sense of that expression. The question of how newness differs from the related notion of contrast will be briefly taken up in section 3.2. The more general question of how factors other than newness may change predictions about accent will be discussed in the introduction to section 3 and in the Conclusion. One factor that I have largely disregarded, even though it has been argued to affect accent as well as other phenomena to such an extent that it should be made a part of the grammar (Oehrle 1988) , is the factor of lexical 'weight', which predicts that certain words are more likely to be accented than others, even if they are in the same syntactic position. 6 Here are some additional disclaimers. I will concentrate on accents in English Noun Phrases that are in a non-predicative position. NPs in a predicative position (e.g.'... is NP') must be considered in combination with their copula, and the question of novelty shifts to the resulting VP. Generalizations of the current proposal to VPs, as well as to other XPs, seem to pose no particular problems, but would require some additional work. For instance, Ewan Klein's ideas on VP-ellipsis, in which DRTs Reference Markers are used to collect the information that is conveyed in a VP can be straightforwardly applied to predict 'newness' accent in VPs, along the lines of the present paper (Klein 1987) . Such an account would also have to explain how a VP (e.g. appointed a at University of Aberdeen on March 1, 2012 http://jos.oxfordjournals.org/ Downloaded from judge) causes its nominalization (e.g. judicial appointment) to become 'given'. Generalization of the present proposal to other Germanic languages seems straightforward, but I have no idea about their validity outside that domain. Further, nothing will be said about the interesting issue of accent placement within the word, or even within Noun-Noun compounds, 7 and in conformance with current practice in DRT, little will be said about limitations of memory. Also, except where recency of information becomes of the essence, we will only ask whether certain information is available in principle from a given piece of discourse. Further, we will remain mostly silent about the Al-hard problem of inferentially given entities, which seems beyond the reach of present theories.
My last disclaimer is that the proposals made in this paper have not yet been tested experimentally, 8 nor were they scrupulously checked against corpora of recorded text. Some aspects of informational status, including definitions of the key notions 'given' and 'new', are still so incompletely understood that the formulation of empirical hypotheses is hampered considerably. Therefore, theory building, in which the basic apparatus for a theory of givenness and newness is developed and in which initial hypotheses are put forward in terms of that apparatus, is still a very relevant activity. The present paper seeks to make some modest theoretical headway, with the emphasis on questions of broad semantics/phonetics architecture, rather than on empirical details.
The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the two building blocks for the proposed approach to intonational focusing. Section 3 explains how these can be put together to build a bridge between meaning and intonation, and conclude with an extended example (section 3.3). Section 4 draws some conclusions.
TWO COMPLEMENTARY THEORIES: DRT AND FOCUS-ACCENT THEORY
The present section will first show why and in what sense givenness and newness of information are semantic affairs at all, and why certain theories of anaphora present themselves as natural tools in this area. Then follows a discussion of the two main building blocks for the theory that I envisage. The first building block, sketched in section 2.2, is a suitably extended version of Discourse Representation Theory (Kamp 1981) , here somewhat immodestly called Generalized Discourse Representation Theory (GDRT) (see van Deemter 1992 van Deemter , 1991 . GDRT will be used to define what it means to constitute given or new information. The second building block is a version of Focus-Accent (F-A) theory as it has been put forward by Baart (1987) and adapted by Dirksen (1992) . As I view it, this theory aims to predict which parts of a sentence are accented, given that some other theory decides which of its major constituents constitute 'given/new information' (i.e. -/+ Focus). In section 3, we will discuss what happens when GDRT fills the slot in F-A theory.
The relevance of semantics
Whether a Noun Phrase must be accented or not depends on its denotation, rather than on its form, or on its full meaning. To illustrate, consider the following examples:
(2) The president arrived. Mr. ~ Clinton was late.
In a setting in which both the president and Mr. Clinton refer to Bill Clinton, the proper name will not normally be accented, even though he is designated by an expression that is physically different from the first occurrence and has a different meaning. 9 Conversely, if the same designator is used with different denotations, accent seems obligatory:
(3) Clinton visited many towns; when he finally arrived in + Clinton, he was late.
(It might be thought that sentences such as (4) and (5) It seems, however, that such cases require some sort of opposition between the two items (the president/Clinton, and Clinton/Clynton), which makes them amenable to a contrastive analysis of the kind proposed by Mats Rooth.
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) More precisely, accenting does not depend on actual denotation, but on believed denotation. What counts is whether the speaker knows that the same individuals are involved in the 'given' and in the 'new' expression. For example, if the speaker does not know that Mr. Clinton is the president, then he or she is bound to accent the proper name in (2). For a slighdy more interesting example, consider (6) The crowd was approaching the castle. The women were very excited.
For the NP the women to get rid of its accent, it is not sufficient that the crowd consists of women. The fact that there are only women in the crowd has to be known to the speaker.
The examples given so far not only show that there is a semantic relevance to accenting, but they also suggest the relevance of a particular kind of semantic theory, namely the theory of anaphora. Here are some commonalities between anaphora and absence of accent:
1. Pronominal anaphora and absence of accent are legitimized if certain information, either in the linguistic or the extralinguistic context, has lent to the relevant item (the anaphor, or some constituent of which the accented item is a part) the status of'given information'. 2. Given information can be repeated, but 'reduced' anaphoric reference is usually more appropriate. Similarly, given information can be accented, but if it is, it tends to be processed more slowly by a hearer (Terken & Nooteboom 1987 ). 3. Both anaphoric reference and the absence of accent presuppose that the relevant information is linguistically accessible. In particular, accessibility tends to be blocked by logical operators. 11 Similar observations hold for conditionals and for modal operators. 4. The distinction between given and new information is made on the level of known or believed referents, rather than, for instance, on a lexical level. That this applies to anaphora can be seen from examples in which a genderneutral NP becomes the antecedent for a non-gender neutral pronoun. For example, the anaphoric pronoun she can take the NP the student as its antecedent, provided the student is assumed to be female.
Capitalizing on these commonalities, we will explore how a theory of anaphora, Kamp's Discourse Representation Theory (DRT), can be put to use in a theory of sentence accent. DRT was chosen because it is the most detailed representative of the family of so-called context-change theories of anaphora, which take the use of given (i.e. contextually provided) pieces of semantic information as their basic mechanism. 
'Generalized'Discourse Representation Theory
Since Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) is now one of the most influential semantics theories, I will not attempt to describe it in detail but refer to Kamp (1981) instead. DRT capitalizes on a distinction between two complementary classes of Noun Phrases: those that introduce an individualdenoting reference marker (RM) into a discourse, and the anaphoric ones that can be identified with an already introduced RM. The first may be described as the 'new' NPs, and the latter as the 'given' ones. Kamp's original work was limited to singular NPs, but later work has extended DRT to discourse with plural NPs. As in the case of singulars, non-anaphoric plural NPs introduce their own RMs, denoting sets (or comparable algebraic structures) of individuals ( van Eijck 1983; Roberts 1987) . Anaphoric reference to plurals leads to additional conditions on already established RMs. The exact way in which a non-anaphoric NP introduces its RM, along with conditions that constrain its interpretation, depends on whether the NP is used collectively or distributively: The condition NP(X) expresses the properties that X must have due to the meaning of the NP that introduced it (see below). The notation $[<p:
= %] abbreviates the result of substitution of x for q> in (j>. The condition b\ => b 2 is the usual DRT-type implication which ensures that the variable y that is introduced in b 1 appears universally quantified. To exemplify, a DRS for the sentence looks as in Figure 1 if tense is disregarded. Note that y ranges over individuals, whereas X ranges over sets. The condition 'The men (X)' can be glossed 'X contains all the men in the universe of discourse, and nothing else'. To express the meaning of conditions of the form NP(X) in general, one can use embedding functions in the style of Kamp (1981) , which map variables to suitable entities in the domain of quantification (cf. vanEijck 1983 for motivation):
NP-condition: An embedding function/verifies DET CN (X) with respect to a model M iff ||DET (CN)^ {f(X)) 8cf{X) £ complemented as usual by the following definition of truth with respect to a model:
Truth: A DRS is true with respect to a model M iff there is an embedding function/ from the RMs of the DRS into the domain of M such that, for all conditions ^ in the DRS,/verifies <j> with respect to M.
As a result, the variable X in our earlier example appears existenrially quantified, and the DRS ends up saying 3X(The men(X) & Vy(y e X-angry (y))), that is: all the men were angry. So much for the introduction of non-anaphoric NPs. For their anaphoric counterparts, the rough idea is that they are used to express new conditions on already established RMs, just as in the case of Kamp's singular RMs. Of course this rough idea must be refined in several ways to become fully accurate. In particular, accommodations have to be made for determiners expressing quantifiers (such as 'few', and 'less than two') that are not monotonically increasing. These quantifiers cannot directly be viewed as making a statement about a set of individuals and have to be 're-analysed' along the lines of van Eijck (1983) . In addition, it has to be guaranteed that anaphoric reference to non-referring NPs in an earlier sentence-so-called e-type anaphors-must refer to the maximal set for which this earlier sentence is true.
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Such complications will, for now, be put aside, since their treatment is well known and less than crucial in the present setting. The present paper makes use of a proposal made in van Deemter (1992) , where the notion of anaphoric reference was extended to include cases in which the 'anaphor' stands in relation to its antecedent other than that of simple identity. This notion of'anaphora' (henceforth the quotation marks are omitted) was applied to Noun Phrases of all kinds, including indefinites, quantifying NPs, and Proper Names. In particular, Generalized DRT accounts for cases of subsectional anaphora, in which the anaphor denotes a real part of its antecedent. The reason is that so many of the phenomena displayed by traditional anaphors can also be found in situations in which die denotation of an NP is context-dependent whilst, nevertheless, its denotation is not equal to that of some other NP in the same text. For example, sentence (8) shows a generalized case of donkey anaphora -a crucial motivating phenomenon for DRT-if the sentence is interpreted as saying something about one or two children in whichever school class goes on a trip.
(8) Whenever a school class goes on a trip, one or two children will hate it.
Subsectional anaphora turns out to be subject to largely the same constraints of syntactic and semantic structure as traditional anaphors. For instance, negation blocks both pronominal and subsectional anaphora (9, 10), but dris does not affect NPs that outscope the negation, such as 'the team' in (10), which can be the antecedent for 'three players'.
(9) There weren't any separate bedrooms in the house. *They/*Two very spacious rooms were quite light, (10) The team did not play last Wednesday. Three players were injured.
Motivated by these and other similarities, a DRT-based treatment of subsectional anaphors was outlined in van Deemter (1992) . This treatment takes its departure from the proposals in Westerstahl (1985) , in which the CN in the familiar quantificational schema Q (CN, B) , where Q is the quantifier and CN and B are its relata, is intersected with some contextually given set. In order to cope with syntactically simple NPs (such as everyone, something, but also proper names and pronouns), this proposal was, in van Deemter (1992) , extended to be directly applicable to entire NPs, as well as CNs.
14 In the sequel, I will sketch how the contextualization of NPs is carried out. Firstly, all NPs introduce reference markers. The earlier rule of Nonanaphoric NP-introduction is restricted in its application to those NPs that are used non-anaphorically. If a Noun Phrase NP, with RM X has subsectional anaphora to another Noun Phrase NP 2 with RM Y, then Nonanaphoric NP-introduction for NP, is modified by relativizing the condition NP, (X) to the antecedent RM Y. This is written (NP,) y (X). Informally, this relativized condition means that the 'ordinary' condition NP,(X) would hold if only individuals from Y were taken into account, and thatX Q Y. 
X A.(n times A).
Note that the two rules of NP introduction are very similar. In particular, an NP introduces an RM of its own, whether it is anaphoric or not To illustrate the rules, consider the situation after the first sentence of (10), and assume that as a result a set Y of players on the team has been introduced. Then when the subsequent sentence means that X contains only elements that are also elements of Y and all of which are defenders, while at least three of X's elements are defenders. Should (n) have read All defenders were injured, then the relativized condition would have been (all defenders) y (X), meaning that X contains only elements of Y and only defenders, while X contains all the defenders that can be found in Y (see Figure 3 ).
Figure 3
The commonalities notwithstanding, our extended notion of anaphora is subject to a few constraints that do not affect pronominal anaphora, or not so ostensibly. One constraint that is especially relevant here requires that if, on a given interpretation of an NP, the descriptive material in the NP makes requirements on denotations that cannot be fulfilled, then this reading is to be discarded. One might erroneously say of a female student, This constraint constitutes a powerful limitation on Noun Phrase interpretation because it exploits all the information that is available in the NP. For example, a reading of (13) in whichfivegirb is anaphoric to two children is ruled out by the fact that a set of five elements does not fit into a superset of two elements.
(13) Two children were up late. * Five girls had a party.
As a consequence of the Resolution Rule, the use of an NP in which it is anaphoric to Ypresupposes that there is an X such that NP y (X). 16 This holds for all NPs, no matter whether they are definite, indefinite, or quantifying. For example, if an NP two girls is anaphoric to an antecedent the children, then the fact that there are at least two girls among the children is presupposed. As always, some Lewis-style accommodation mechanism must be in place to account for presupposition failure. It is important to note that the generalized notion of anaphora subsumes the old one, which becomes a natural subclass of anaphors, namely those that have the relation of Identity Anaphora to their antecedents:
Identity Anaphora: Let NP,-correspond with RM X and NP; with RM Y in a certain DRS. Then NP,-has identity anaphora to NP ; -iff (1) the Anaphoric NPintroduction rule has introduced the clause NP, y (X) into the DRS; and (2) the conditions of the entire DRS, together with the speaker's background knowledge, imply logically that X = Y.
This definition allows identity anaphora to depend on whether the speaker is able to infer the identity of the two RMs. Actual equality is not enough: if the two RMs are equal, but the speaker cannot infer this fact, then the two count as different. Note that the question of whether a particular case of anaphora constitutes identity anaphora may be settled in various ways. Suppose NP-= The CNj and NP,-= The CN { . Then the speaker's knowledge to the effect that all the CN,-are CN,-, and hence X = Y, may derive from different sources. Sometimes, this may hold due to word meaning. For instance, if NP,-= The people and NP ; --The women, then the condition NP, y (X) implies X -Y, given that, by definition, all women are people. But the inclusion may also be a matter of world knowledge. For example, the speaker may have known beforehand, or be informed during the discourse, that all the CN 7 -in the model happen to be CN,-, or he/she may even know the exact denotations of CN,-and CN,-in the model.
It is a consequence of the definition of Identity Anaphora that most occurrences of pronouns are identity anaphors if it is assumed diat pronouns introduce RMs like any other NP does, along with a condition that is specific for the pronoun in question ( van Deemter 1992) . For example, the pronoun she may be associated with a condition She(X) on its RM X saying that X is a singleton containing a female element. This would cause the relativized condition She y (X) to mean that X is a singleton consisting of the only female element in Xn Y. If Y itself is a singleton, this makes She y (X) equivalent to X = Y, resulting in identity anaphora. A more conservative definition of She(X) would also require that the universe contains only one element. This reading would make identity anaphora obligatory for pronouns, ruling out subsectional uses, as in The married couple came out of the City Hall. She was pretty.
Before moving on to matters of sentence accent, let me mention one more extension of the above-outlined framework that will have intonational relevance. This extension concerns relational NPs, as when an NP with a relational Noun expresses a relation (i.e. the relation that is contained in the Noun) with a contextually available antecedent. The treatment in van Deemter (1992) makes such NPs 'anaphoric' to the contextually expressed 'antecedent', thus extending the notion of anaphora even further than subsectional anaphora. For example, if the children has introduced the antecedent RM Y for the relational NP the mother, then the mother introduces an RM X along with the relativized condition (The mother) y (X), which expresses that X contains a unique individual that is the mother of all the elements in Y. We will later see how this analysis leads to the right predictions with respect to sentence accent.
So much for the theory of discourse that we will make use of. In the following section, the other building block for our theory of accent, FocusAccent theory (F-A theory), will be sketched out.
Focus-Accent theory
The main virtue of F-A theory, in the tradition of Liberman & Prince (1977) and Ladd (1980) , is that it brings out the role of syntax in the determination of sentence accent. Syntax mediates between such informational affairs as given and new information on the one hand and linguistic form on the other. (See e.g. Nooteboom & Kruyt 1987 for an excellent explanation.)
One of the most detailed versions of F-A theory that I have been able to find was put forward by Arthur Dirksen and Hugo Quene (Dirksen 1992; Dirksen & Quene 1991) , in which some earlier ideas from Baart (1987) are clarified and adapted to a computational setting. It is this version of the theory that will be presented here, in a simplified form that is subsequently adapted to suit present purposes. Dirksen uses a version of Phrase Structure grammar to build up metrical trees, which are like the trees that result from ordinary Phrase Structure rules, and in which each node has between o and 2 branches, each of which is marked as either Strong or Weak At least initially, if a given node has one daughter, then it will be marked Strong, and if it has two daughters, then one of them is Strong and the other.Weak. In English, it will mostly be the right daughter that is marked Strong, but in languages with different word order, such as German and Dutch, the pattern varies considerably. It is assumed that some nodes are somehow marked for Focus, using + F if the node is known to be 'interpreted as "new" or otherwise important addition to the discourse'. In Dirksen's (1992) program, this is simply done by marking all major phrases (NP, VP, AdjP) as +F. Accent is located by a recursive Correspondence Rule:
Correspondence Rule: For each node X, X is accented if (a) X is marked as +F, or (b) X is Strong, and the node immediately dominating X is accented.
Strong nodes inherit accent from their parent node, while weak nodes do not have accent, unless they are marked +F. For instance, consider the sentence To arrive at the correct predictions in other cases, metrical trees are subject to various transformations before the Correspondence Rule becomes active. The most important of these is the Default Accent Rule, which determines where an accent will land if its natural landing site is somehow incapacitated or 'deaccented'.
In Dirksen (1992) , an expression is deaccented if it is listed in the lexicon as one that 'cannot be accented' (my gloss), which is true for words such as the, a, and it, 18 but we will use the term for any marking on an expression diat causes accent to be blocked. In addition, it will be convenient to use deaccented to designate the effect on accenting that is caused by deaccenting through the Default Accent Rule, namely that accent shifts from the deaccented node to somewhere else. In Dirksen (1992) , any node that is deaccented becomes -F. Thus, in Mary reads it, the fact that 'it' is deaccented causes it to be marked -F and causes the w and s labels on reads and the Noun Phrase to be reversed, leaving reads as Strong and it as Weak (Figure 6 ). The VP, being a major phrase, is marked as +F, so the Correspondence Rule will cause reads to be accented and it not to be accented. It has been suggested that the mechanism that takes care of lexical deaccenting is also at work if a node is deaccented for contextual reasons (Baart 1987) . In section 3.2, we will see how this idea can be worked out. Before offering a simple flow diagram to visualize the order in which the rules of F-A theory could apply, I propose two slight modifications in Dirksen's formalism, for the benefit of later additions. Our goal here is to let +/-F reflect new/given status, clearing it from contamination by lexical ('cannot be accented') information. The first modification is to introduce a separate label, -L, for lexical items that are marked 'cannot be accented'. As a result, it, in our example, will be marked both +F and -L. Now in order to prevent accent in Mary reads it from landing both on read (due to the Default Accent Rule) and on it (due to the +F label), the Correspondence Rule is modified as follows:
Modified Correspondence Rule: For each node X, X is accented if (a) X is marked as +F, but X is not marked as -L, or (b) X is Strong, and the node immediately dominating X is accented.
As a result, ~L will not trigger the Default Accent Rule, but also block accent on the word that is marked as -L, but leaving +/-F status unaffected. In the following section, the connection between F-A theory and GDRT will be pointed out.
A DISCOURSE REPRESENTATION THEORY FOR THE PREDICTION AND INTERPRETATION OF ACCENT
One reason why it is hard to come up with a plausible theory of sentence accent is the considerable variability in accenting that has been shown in empirical studies, both between different speakers and with the same speaker. From the hearer's side, it has been observed that adding an accent to an utterance that is intonationally acceptable will still often lead to an utterance that is completely acceptable under the same circumstances (see e.g. Terken 1985) . On the other hand, beyond a certain point, more accents cause processing difficulties. In particular, if given information is accented, processing by the hearer tends to slow down (Terken & Nooteboom 1987) . This experimental fact is mirrored by the often-heard opinion that current accenting programs overgenerate accents. (This point is argued e.g. in Hirschberg 1990.) Given this situation, it seems prudent to start out with a minimalistic approach, describing an accenting pattern that is minimal given a certain context and a certain meaning. 19 Later, in section 4, it will be shown how a more sophisticated account, indicating which additional accents may be added, can be superimposed on this minimal account.
The current section outlines a theory of sentence accent on Noun Phrases, by showing how the two theories of the previous section can complement each other. In particular, it is shown how DRT can make F-A theory more precise in two respects: the definition of focus (+/-F), and the conditions under which deaccenting obtains. The version of F-A theory that underlies Dirksen's work is modified by adopting versions of the following rules:
1. An NP is marked +F if it introduces a new entity into the discourse, and it is marked -F otherwise. 2. Deaccenting applies not only to certain lexically marked function words, but also to expressions that are somehow 'given'.marking on all major phrases. Rule 2 will extend Dirksen's notion of deaccenting by proposing two semantic triggers for deaccenting, both of which once again have to do with givenness in a discourse. Rule 3 is a simple extension of the Default Accent Rule that takes this extended notion of deaccenting into account. The notions of givenness and newness that are used in these rules will be made more exact by means of the discourse theory that was outlined in section 2.2. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 together will deal with point (1), and points (2) and (3) will be taken up in section 3.2.
Plus or minus focus, as modelled by DRT
Under what circumstances must the entity that was introduced by a Noun Phrase be regarded as 'new', and when as 'given'? One natural definition of givenness would define an occurrence NP,-as 'given' if it is anaphoric to some NPy. However, anaphoricity is not enough, since anaphora has now been stretched beyond Identity Anaphora. For example, as our earlier example (6) shows (repeated here as (15)): if a certain crowd is known to consist of men and women, then accent on women is obligatory, even though the NP is anaphorically related to the crowd:
(15) The crowd was approaching the castle. The + women were very excited.
In other words, a new conglomerate of elements counts as a 'new' discourse entity, even if all the elements are taken from an entity that constitutes given information. For example, if in the above sentence it is assumed that the crowd consists of women only, then it is better not to accent women, since the women has identity anaphora to the crowd. Moreover, what counts is not simply whether two NPs stand in a certain anaphoric relation, but whether they can be construed in such a way that they do so. For example, two subsequent occurrences of one and the same Proper Name, both of which denote the same individual, can, but need not be construed as standing in a relation of Identity Anaphora. 20 A definition, therefore, has to say the following:
1' Givenness. An occurrence NP,-is 'given' due to NPy iff NP,-can be construed as standing in a relation of Identity Anaphora to NPy. An NP occurrence is given, or -F, iff it is given due to some other NP occurrence. An NP occurrence is 'new' if it is not given.
Given the GDRT framework of section 2.2, NP,-can be construed as standing in a relation of Identity Anaphora to NPy iff (a) NP ; -is accessible to NP,., (b) the anaphoric relation between NP,-and NPy fulfils the Resolution Constraint, and (c) the respective RMs for NP,-and NP,-can be inferred to be equal. Before moving on to discuss some examples, let us look at some special classes of NPs. For example, the definition of Identity Anaphora causes principle 1' to predict that pronouns will appear unaccented, unless they have subsectional anaphora-or, of course, unless some other factor such as contrastiveness or non-normal interpretation is involved (cf. section 1). And this prediction is borne out by the facts, for the identity anaphoric occurrence of she in (16) is not normally accented, but if a subsectionally anaphoric occurrence of she in (17) Only in a case where the proper name refers to an entity that was itself already established (either by a proper name or by some other means) will our theory predict that no accent is required: Finally, the theory predicts that relational anaphora will normally require accent, since it is normally used to introduce a new individual, or set of individuals, in the discourse. For example, in (21) The children were hungry. The + mother was sick.
the mother is distinct from the children, and therefore has to be accented. Again, the prediction seems to be correct. Now that a notion of givenness has been defined for Noun Phrases, let us give some more detailed examples, in order to show how word meaning and sentence accent combine to constrain Noun Phrase interpretation. After these examples, we will turn to the topic of deaccenting. Consider What are the possible readings of the second sentence? For simplicity, assume that word meaning equals word denotation. A Noun denotes a set of individuals. A Verb denotes a predicate P over sets 5 of individuals, with the understanding that, in the case of a distributive interpretation of the proposition P(S), a suitable first order version P' of P will be true of all the individual elements of S. Assume that the speaker has complete knowledge about the denotations of all the relevant Nouns, and that D = [h i,..., h 10} is the universe of discourse. Then:
1. Assume h 1, h 2, and h 3 are the only children in D, so ||Children| = [h 1, h 2, h 3}. Further, assume that some girls are too old to count as children. More specifically, in this particular domain, |Girls|| = [h 1, /i2, h 3, /14, h 5}, so all the children in D are girls. If no information about accenting is available, the sentence has a non-anaphoric interpretation, in which the Noun Phrase of the second sentence refers to all the girls in D. That is:
3XQD: The girls (X) & Vy(y e X-not-sleep (y)).
In accordance with section 2.2, the predicate The girls(X) means that X contains all the girls in D and girls only. Consequently, the utterance means that all the girls in D could not sleep. The Noun Phrase The girls constitutes new information, and consequently it must appear accented. Since girls is the right sibling of The (cf. section 2.3), the accent will land on girls. 2. Given the same assumptions, there is also an anaphoric reading of the sentence, in which The girls is interpreted 'against the background' of the antecedent The children. Let A denote the set of children. Following the rules outlined above, the following interpretation results:
3X^D: (The girls)^(X) & Vy(ye X-not-sleep (y)).
The clause (The girls)^(X) means that X contains all the children in A, and nothing more than that. But since all elements of A are children, X just equals A, so this is a case of identity anaphora. The girls represents given information, and no accent is required. 3. The same assumptions as before, except that ||girls|| -{Ai, A3, /15}. Of course, a non-anaphoric reading of The girls couldn't sleep remains possible. An anaphoric reading, with The children as antecedent, will be obtained using the same formula as in (2). This time, however, the formula results in a subsectional anaphor, since the set of girls that are also children is a real subset of the set ||children||. Therefore, The girls constitutes new information and must be accented, exactly as in (1) 3
.2 Deaccenting of otherwise-accented material
The proposals of the previous two sections determine whether a Noun Phrase must be marked as +F. One might think that this ought to be the end of this paper, since F-A theory can do whatever else there is to do, positioning all the accents in their appropriate places within major phrases that are marked +F. However, this is not true. For instance, if a +F NP contains a -F NP, then accent cannot land anywhere within the -F NP, and this is something current implementations of F-A theory do not take into account. For example, suppose in the following example the town of Leyden is the topic of the discourse, so the town constitutes given information. Then accent shifts from it to atmosphere:
(23) He loved, the +atmosphere of the ~town.
The Noun town is deaccented, losing its accent due to the fact that it is part of a -F NP. To distinguish this case from a different kind of givenness to be discussed presently, we will call a -F NP object-given. It will be shown in a while how deaccenting due to object-givenness can be accounted for in the same way as Lexical deaccenting, by a slight extension of the Default Accent Rule.
A very similar mechanism can account for a kind of deaccenting that does not arise from object-givenness of a -F NP that is embedded in a +F NP. Consider the following examples: (24 Here, the second occurrence of car is deaccented, and accent shifts to need, but it would be highly implausible to attribute this shift to any contrastive force in need. Consequently, a 'contrastive' account cannot cover all the facts at hand. According to the present account, the dynamics is the other way round: car is deaccented since it is given information, and as a result-by another application of the Default Accent Rule-accent shifts to need. To make this idea precise, some notion of a givenness must be defined that makes the words men, girls, and car given, even if they are part of a +F NP. I will define such a notion and call it concept-givenness, in opposition to the notion of object-givenness that has been discussed so far.
How should concept-givenness be defined? Evidence suggests that conceptgivenness affects words of all categories. Note that an antecedent that appears within the scope of a logical operator can legitimize the lack of an accent in a word that appears outside the scope. In (26) this happened with material in the scope of a conditional. (27) Recency, on the other hand, seems to be a much stronger factor in conceptgivenness than in object-givenness. Therefore, a tentative bound on the 'memory limitations' for concept-givenness is hypothesized, even though the exact form of this limitation is a matter for further empirical research. So far, we have only studied concept-givenness in cases where the antecedent and the given word are identical. Note, however, that concept-givenness, like object-givenness, is a semantical affair not the word itself, but the referent counts. A word can be deaccented because it is synonymous with a word in the previous sentence: But here, the relation is asymmetrical: it is only the subsuming (i.e. extensionally larger) word that can be deaccented due to the subsumed one. For instance, one cannot deaccent bicycle because of an earlier occurrence ofvehicle.
(31) Juan owns a vehicle. *You absolutely need a ~bicycleifyou work at Stanford.
Again, what counts is known or believed subsumption of the referent of one word by the referent of another. For example, ifthe people is known to refer to a group of women, then women may be deaccented since the referent of people is subsumed by (in this case, equals) the referent of women:
(32) John pitied the poor people.
+ Two ~women were severely ill.
Deaccenting seems to be a directional process that operates strictly from left to right. There are apparent exceptions of bidirectional deaccenting, but there some sort of contrast must always play a role, as has been argued in Rooth (1992) . For example, in (33) An + American 'farmer was talking to a ^Canadian 'farmer.
both occurrences of farmer lack an accent, but this is better explained by an obligatory (contrastive) accent on American and Canadian, which triggers the loss of an accent on farmer (see note 21). In light of these considerations, I propose to define concept-givenness as follows:
Concept-givenness: An occurrence w of a word is concept-given if the same or the previous sentence contains, to the left of w, another occurrence w', of an expression, 24 whose reference is known to be subsumed by that of w.
The deaccenting principle 2 can then be given the following form:
2' Deaccenting. Deaccent not only certain function words, but also all the words in any occurrence of a Noun Phrase that is identity-anaphoric to another Noun Phrase (i.e. any expression that is object-given), as well as any occurrence of a word that is 'concept-given'.
The Default Accent Rule would take concept-givenness into account in the following way. Suppose a Strong node has a Weak as well as a Strong daughter. Then if the Strong daughter is deaccented, a transformation applies that changes the Strong daughter into a Weak one and the Weak daughter into a Strong one. But what if both daughters of a node are deaccented? Double deaccenting arises in a sentence like (30) above, where the determiner a will be deaccented for lexical reasons, while the other daughter of the Noun Phrase, namely the Noun vehicle, will be deaccented since it is concept-given. An example in which both daughters of a Noun Phrase are deaccented due to concept-givenness is the following piece of discourse (which might be the beginning of a brainteaser):
(34) Juan is the owner of two bicycles. Whenever he meets someone who owns ~twõ vehicles too,...
As before, the two Noun Phrases two bicycles and two vehicles are object-new, since they introduce potentially different sets of vehicles into the discourse. These examples suggest that if both daughters are deaccented, then neither of them needs an accent.
3' Default Acccent Rule. If the Strong daughter of a node is deaccented while the other one is not, then the labels Weak and Strong are reversed. If both daughters are deaccented, then both are relabelled Weak. The order of the assignments of F, C, and L is arbitrary, since they do not depend on each other. Moreover, the Default Accent Rule does not distinguish between the three markings, so they could be lumped together into one single marking that does not distinguish between different sources of deaccenting. They were kept separate for expository reasons, however.
An extended example
In the following, a few small pieces of discourse will be used to illustrate some of the key concepts introduced so far. We will use sentences in which there are no obstacles to anaphoric accessibility, and consequently there is no need to draws DRSs for them. In addition, it will be assumed that all the syntax rules that have two daughters have the right daughter marked as strong and the left one as weak. 26 First, consider (35) followed by (36):
(35) The children were upstairs.
(36) The girls cried.
A simple phrase structure grammar might analyse (36) along the following lines (cf. Figure 7) . 21 Now that we are dealing with a realistic example, we have to be specific about how to mark major phrases other than the NP for + or -F. Any VP will be marked as +F provided it encodes information that is, intuitively speaking, not contained in the previous sentence. In analogy with newness of NPs, newness of VPs thus depends on the newness of the entity itself, and not on whether the resulting predication is informative. 28 Now first assume that both major phrases in (36) constitute new information. Both are marked +F, while all the children in the domain happen to be girls. In this case, the Default Accent Rule plays no role and the Correspondence Rule will ensure that accent trickles down from DefNP to girls and from
VP to cried 29
Next, change the example by assuming that (it is known that) all children are girls. In that case, there are two reasons why accent will not land on girls. Firstly, the word girls is now concept-given, since the girls subsume the children. Secondly, the DefNP as a whole is now object-given, and therefore -F. As a consequence, all movements within the NP become irrelevant, and only cried will be accented. Now for a slightly more complex sentence. Imagine the same context, The children were upstairs, but what has to be determined is the accents in Assume this utterance can be analysed as depicted in Figure 8 . Again, first imagine a situation in which some of the children are not girls, so the girls constitutes new information. Then the Default Accent Rule is idle, and accent in the NondefNP, which is an indefinite NP and consequently +F, 30 will trickle down to girls as a result of the Correspondence Rule. Assuming that the VP conveys new information as well, accent in the VP will, of course, land on the only word it comprises: cried. Now move on to the more interesting situation in which all the children are girls. As a result, the defNP the girls is -F, so the Default Accent Rule causes the Weak/Strong values on Predet and DefNP, respectively, to be swapped. But now assume that all prepositions are listed in the dictionary as -L, so the w and s labels on the daughters of the Predet are swapped as well. Then accent will trickle down from the NondefNP to the Nondefdet three. As in the earlier example, the fact that girls is now concept-given does not play a role. On the other hand, if this piece of discourse is followed by a third sentence saying (38) (On the other hand,) three of thegirls sang, then both daughters of the Predet Three of are concept-given, and therefore deaccented, while the DefNP thegirb is still -F. As a result, the entire subject of the sentence has to make do without an accent (due to rule 3'), and the only obligatory accent lands on sang.
CONCLUSION
The paper has outlined a set of rules expressing how sentence accent and semantic information mutually constrain each other. Given background information about the denotation of content words in a discourse, intended meaning restricts the opportunities for sentence accent in speech. Conversely, given the same background information, sentence accent determines the sort of anaphoric relation that can be expected to hold in a given piece of spoken discourse. In the process, two different distinctions between given and new information have been defined, which seem genuinely irreducible to each other. For a word to require newness accent, it has to occur in an object-new NP, and in addition it has to be concept-new itelf. Thus, concept-newness is no sufficient condition for accenting: a word may be concept-new, but unless it adds up to introducing a new discourse entity, no accent is required.
Let us briefly compare these two notions of'newness of information'. When something is advertised as new information, at least the following questions are in order (here followed by answers that follow from the account that was given in this paper):
(i) Whose knowledge determines whether a piece of information counts as given or as new?-In both object-newness and in concept-newness, it is speaker knowledge that determines given/new status.
(
ii) At what Ihel of description is it that the entity is new?-Both notions have to be
defined at the level of semantic denotations, while it is always the conglomerate of objects that counts, rather than the individual elements of the conglomerate. Hence the distinction between Identity Anaphors, which count as given, and Subsectional Anaphors, which count as new information. Further, (iii) Once an entity is given, how long, and under what structural constraints, will it remain so?-Object-givenness is subject to the same accessibility constraints as Noun Phrase anaphora. Concept-givenness, on the other hand, is much less sensitive to structural constraints, but has to fulfil very strict constraints on the recency of the legitimizer.
Note that this proposal makes newness and givenness discourse-based and knowledge-based at the same time: the key is always in the knowledge of the speaker, but what counts is his or her knowledge about the reference of certain expressions in the discourse. For example, when the first sentence of a discourse brings up the name Mr. Clinton, then this name must be accented even if the existence of its referent is common knowledge. Even a known entity can only become 'given' by linguistic, or possibly deictic means.
The current proposal shows how theories originally designed to deal with the semantics of anaphora can also be instrumental in predicting whether a given expression constitutes given or new information and whether it requires pitch accent. Thus, intonation contributes to the 'dynamics of interpretation' that is currently of so much concern to semanticists (see e.g. vanBenthem 1991 for an overview), proving that traditional reservations about the 'informational' relevance of intonation as worded in Bolinger (1989) (see Introduction of the present paper) are less and less warranted.
I should repeat that newness is only one possible source of accent, and that other sources of accents exist. Although a unified theory of how all these fit together is obviously beyond the scope of the present paper, here are some speculative remarks.
First, there are some other 'objective' factors that can be decoded by a hearer. One example is the mechanism of'answer-newness' (my term) that was perhaps first noted in Kuno (1972) and discussed at length in van Kuppevelt (1991) , requiring that any constituent that functions as an answer to an explicit or implicit question is focused.
31 Dick Oehrle has observed that an expression that is marked as focused due to answer-newness can never be deaccented due to concept-givenness or object-givenness. For example, consider the following question-answer pair. Here, Max constitutes the answer to the question in (39a), and consequently it appears focused (cf. e.g. van Kuppevelt 1991) . The fact that Max is, at the same time, also concept-given (and object-given) does not block an accent on Max. Deaccenting will only operate inside a constituent that is answer-new, witness the following example (which is, like the previous one, copied from Oehrle 1988 marking on a constituent means that the constituent is either object-new or answer-new (or both). Thus, a constituent that is answer-new but object-given will still be marked +F and consequently, the Default Accent Rule will not be triggered. The same thing holds if a constituent is marked object-new but answer-given. On the other hand, the Default Accent Rule will be triggered if a part of an answer-new constituent is deaccented due to object-givenness, concept-givenness, or lexical deaccenting. Although the issue of incorporating answser-newness with the rest of our framework would merit further verification, the predictions of this preliminary account look plausible enough. Another objective factor that needs further study is the mechanism of contrast. For even though newness can, as was shown in section 3.2, account for many of the accenting facts that are usually explained by the notion of contrast, there is still work to do for a notion of contrast. For example, a contrastive analysis is still required for cases in which both items that are contrasted have the status of given information, as in The notion of contrast that is accountable for these remaining phenomena must be very different from the issues of novelty and givenness that have been dealt with in this paper, since it involves some sort of syntactic/semantic symmetry between the two items involved (I am impressed by Bergkamp versus / am impressed by Van Basten) and is, in most cases, non-directional and therefore, presumably, non-anaphoric in nature. This motivates why the notion of contrast has not been discussed at length in this paper. To what extent contrast, as well as such 'subjective' factors as liveliness and emotion, can be treated along the same lines as answer-newness, by allowing them to contribute only +F marking (in the case of contrast, emotion, liveliness) and never -F marking (in the case of a lack of contrast, emotion, liveliness), is a matter for further research. Subjective factors, of course, tend to introduce variability in accenting. However, the resulting variability seems to be constrained by a rule that says: subjective accents are only allowed if the intended interpretation can be recovered. For example, consider This occurrence of Mr. Clinton constitutes identity anaphora, and therefore no accent is predicted. On the other hand, if the proper name is nevertheless accented, confusion is not likely to arise, as long as the circumstances make it clear that it is the president who is intended, rather than one of his namesakes. This suggests the hypothesis that subjective accents may be added as long as they do not lead to irrecoverably wrong interpretations when they are interpreted by an 'objective' theory of the kind presented in this paper. But granted that subjective accents are sometimes allowed, their occurrence should still be expected to cost time and effort on the part of the hearer. Thus, if it is true, the hypothesis that was just formulated would explain Terken & Nooteboom's (1987) finding that accents on given information tend to slow down processing (see section 3). The remarkable fact that, conversely, accents may not be deleted as easily by subjective factors may arise from the oftenclaimed propensity of accent to highlight the non-obvious. If highlighting the non-obvious is the overall function of accent, then the erasure of accents would be a hazard to successful communication, which is better avoided.
This concludes my speculations beyond the confines that were set up in the Introduction. Implementing a semantic theory of accent, even in its present modest form, would be a formidable task, given the role of discourse theory and background knowledge in such a theory. But theories of discourse are making progress, and even though background knowledge in general is hard to model, knowledge about word denotations is available in most natural language understanding systems. For example, current question-answering systems typically have complete (although, of course, application-dependent) knowledge about the denotation of the words in their domain, and this is, as we have seen, more than sufficient to determine whether two Noun Phrases can stand in the relation of Identity Anaphora, which is the key notion of a theory of newness accent. NOTES 1 I will take accent to be defined as the prosodic phenomenon whereby part of a sentence stands out as prominent for listeners. It is assumed that pitch movement is the most important determinant of accent, with loudness, and possibly other factors, such as speech tempo, playing a lesser role. See 't Hart et al. (1991) for a precise framework. 2 Arguably, the notion of contrast is the central one in Rooth's work. An accented expression is typically construed as standing in contrast with one or more 'alternative' expressions. The main contribution of accent is to help determine which alternative expressions are to be taken into account (Rooth 1992). 3 In particular, a number of researchers, apparently using a slightly more liberal definition of accent than researchers in the tradition oft Hart etal. (1991) , have contended that low pitch accents can mark 'given' information (Pierrehumbert & Hirschberg 1990 ). 4 See, for example, van Kuppevelt (1991) for an excellent survey and criticism of existing proposals in this area. 5 This includes both the 'bridging' phenomena that have been investigated in the psychohnguistic literature (discussed briefly as Relational Anaphora in section 2.2) as well as the phenomenon of socalled Subsectional Anaphora (ibid.) 6 Rather than incorporating lexical weight into the grammar, I follow the conventional practice of separating syntactic factors (which will be encoded in the phrase structure rules of Focus-Accent theory) from lexical ones. Moreover, the latter notion is simplified by means of a rough dychotomy between words that do and words that do not 'like' accent (i.e. the +/-L marking in my version of FocusAccent Theory, cf. section 2.3). A more accurate theory might be obtained by using a more discriminating approach. nothing is gained from viewing the second occurrence as anaphoric to the first, since this does not affect the meaning of either occurrence. But the fact that they can be so viewed causes the second occurrence to lose its obligatory accent. 21 As usual, the fact that an accent is not predicted does not mean that accent is per se impossible, but rather that it is not necessary for reasons of informational status alone. In the concluding section, the issues of variability in accenting will be taken up. 22 Presumably, the F-A mechanism here would be a reverse of the Default Accent Rule, saying that if a node has a Weak and a Strong daughter, while the Weak daughter stands in contrast with something else, then the Weak and Strong labels are swapped. Rooth does not discuss the mechanism by which accents land on one particular part of a +F NP. Moreover, the motivation of Rooth's (1992) theory of contrast (ibid., p. 80) is intended to be restricted to symmetric contrast, even though the actual rules proposed there make wider predictions. 23 Note that the absence of accents in 'car cannot be explained by any plausible version of object-givenness, since the discourse entities in question are completely novel. This holds in (26) as well as in (27) . Cases requiring some form of concept-givenness have already been mentioned in Chafe (1976 For a discussion of how, in the setting of GDRT, the familiarity constraint follows from general Gricean considerations, see van Deemter (1992) . 31 Note that this makes information of the hearer, rather than the speaker, the crucial issue for answer-newness; compare point (i) above. 32 Here, the VP insulted Max is answer-new, and now the fact that Max is conceptgiven (and object-given) leads to a shift of accent within the VP.
